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Captain Johann Ewald's Hessians in the American Revolution 
Gregory D. Bereiter 
Wen the British government resolved to use force in order to subdue its rebellious American colonies, it was all but certain that the Ministry would tum to foreign auxiliaries, 
a convention which was by that time "accepted in international law as well as 
practice.'" In the summer of 1775, the King ofEngland, George III, had at most 
8,500 effective land troops stationed in the American colonies and 18,000 in 
various garrisons ofGreat Britain, and it quickly became apparent that initial 
plans for the sub!ugation of the American colonies "had been conceived on 
too small a scale.' An anny of55,000 was authorized for America. but recruiting 
had become "a slow business.,,3 Thus, if Britain wished to put down the 
rebellion by force, it could do so only by resorting once more to the practice 
ofhiring foreign auxiliary troops. Without the Gennan auxiliaries, "the attempt 
to subdue America would have [been] unthinkable.,,4 
After overtures to hire 20,000 additional troops from Empress Catherine II 
ofRussia failed, England turned to the princes ofGennany, several ofwhom 
were fonner military allies and had for many years been supplying troops to 
fight under foreign flags in return for financial remuneration. From the Duke 
of Brunswick, the Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel, and the Prince of Waldeck, 
Epgland hired at this time 17,775 men for service in America. Of the estimated 
29,867 German troops that eventually fought for Great Britain on the American 
continent, nearly two-thirds came from the two Hessian states, Hesse-Kassel 
and Hesse-Hanau. In the American colonies, however, all of these German 
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troops were collectively and indiscriminately called by one name, Hessians.
While military historians have documented the presence of the Hessians 
in the American Revolution, their overall contribution to the British war effort 
has been significantly underplayed and at times overlooked altogether. Indeed, 
one could even assert that their treatment has been rather perfunctory. The 
Hessians have been treated as mere participants, "warm bodies" under careless 
and inexperienced leadership, a force of which was easily overrun by 
Washington at Trenton on Christmas night, 1776; certainly there are "few 
episodes so familiar to Americans" as Washington's crossing of the Delaware 
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en route to this famous engagement. However, relatively scant attention has 
.;;. been devoted to the overall contribution of the Hessian forces to the British 
~	 war effort and the significance oftheir role has been neither fully appreciated 
nor completely understood. 
Constructing The Past 
The diary ofCaptain Johann Ewald, a company commander in the Hessian 
Field Jager Corps, is an important contribution to the understanding of the 
nature of the War of the Revolution, as it enables us to arrive at a more 
accurate estimation of the significant Hessian contribution to the British war 
effort, particularly that ofCaptain Ewald and the Jager Corps, the Hessian elite 
light infantry. Consequently, the standing military histories ofthe American 
Revolution are in need ofa revision which will restore the importance of the 
Hessians as a far more significant part of the total British fighting force that 
attempted to subdue the American colonies. The Ewald diary opens up the 
wider issues ofHessian participation and our interpretation of the same, as we 
can clearly ascertain the importance and significance of Ewald and the Jager 
Corps to the British army. Moreover, the Ewald diary deepens our 
understanding of the nature of the military conflict as seen through the eyes 
of a capable Hessian officer who fought in every major battle from New York 
to Yorktown, as well as dozens of the small engagements that characterized 
the war in America. 
The Ewald diary is additionally important because it allows us to better 
understand the nature ofthe AmericanRevolution as a military contest. Ewald's 
observations shed new light on key military issues and provide fresh evidence 
of other historical issues of the American Revolutionary period. His diary 
reveals not only the importance of the Hessian Jager Corps to the British army, 
but also gives students of the American Revolution a first-hand look at the 
partisan and irregular nature ofthe war. Ewald's military judgments concerning 
British conduct of the war reveal the highly politicized nature of the conflict 
and the overall problems with British strategy. His observations concerning 
the American army reveal a determined body ofsoldiers who willingly endured 
continual hardship in order to cast off the yoke of the English government. 
Thus, by thoroughly examining the diary of Captain Ewald, we can not 
only correct the standing military histories of the Revolution to include the 
importance of the Hessian Jager Corps as a far more significant part of the 
British war effort, but we can in essence understand more distinctly the nature 
ofthe conflict that ultimately resulted in the "utter loss ofthe thirteen splendid 
provinces of the Crown ofEngland."8 
The Statistics 
The sheer size of the Hessian contingent that went to America in 1776 
warrants serious examination and assists in making the case that they were not 
a negligible factor in the British war effort. Indeed, nearly 30,000 well trained, 
well-disciplined soldiers, the total number of German troops that eventually 
served with Great Britain, is hardly an inconsiderable number. 
At the time the British government wa~ negotiating the treaties that would 
eventually bring the German auxiliaries into their service, the British army in 
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America had at most 8,500 men. General Sir William Howe knew that his 1776 
campaign had to wait on the arrival of the recently hired Gennan troops, 8,000 
ofwhich were to be added directly to his anny at New York.9 The Hessians-were 
indeed "an essential part of the British war plan for 1776," as a total of 12, 974 
entered British service that year. 10 They were also tough, disciplined regulars 
"officered by veterans trained in the school ofFrederick the Great and Ferdinand 
of Brunswick."11 The Americans, on the other hand, had no where near that 
many trained, disciplined, professional soldiers under anns. Washington could 
boast a force near 19,000, but they were "largely untrained, undisciplined, 
untried amateur soldiers" who were poorly anned, with only 9,000 being 
Continental regulars "possessing some small approximation of regular military 
skill ... the rest [being] short-term militiamen.12 . 
Certainly, in sheer nwnbers alone the German auxiliaries were not a negligible 
factor. They were indeed a formidable presence and "indispensable additions" 
to the nwnerical strength ofthe British army, ultimately composing approximately 
one-third ofthe British fighting force in America. 13 
Political Implications 
The hiring ofthe German auxiliaries in 1775 "reaped a harvest ofhatred" in 
the American colonies. '4 To the colonists, many of whom still regarded 
themselves as British subjects, the hiring of foreign troops to settle a domestic 
quarrel with the colonies "was a clear sign that the Ministry was relying on 
coercion, leaving no option but resistance."ls By contemporary European 
standards, it was "normal practice" to hire auxiliary troops to fight against 
foreign enemies, "but the hiring ofthem by Britain seemed irrefutable proof to 
the colonists that they were to be treated as foreigners."'6 When the 
intercolonial Congress at Philadelphia heard the news of the German treaties, 
they immediately took further actions "to shore up the American cause."17 
Congress established the Committee of Secret Correspondence to conduct 
diplomacy with foreign nations and created a Continental navy.IS Moreover, 
many members ofCongress called for the establishment of state governments 
and a confederation ofstates, which were to be the first steps toward autonomy. 
Thus, the news of the Gennan treaties greatly increased colonial animosity 
toward the British government, solidified military resistance to the Crown as 
had few other factors, and "gave added impetus to the fateful Declaration of 
Independence. "19 
What Historians Have Said 
It seems odd then that the Hessian contribution to the British war effort 
during the American Revolution has been somewhat overlooked and even ;1 discounted by prominent Revolutionary historians. The more notable literature 
concerning the military struggle either omits evaluation of the Hessian 
h 6" 
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contribution or treats it in a rather perfunctory manner. The Hessians were 
there, historians admit; they were a part of the British forces, historians concede. 
Washington at Trenton defeated a garrison of Hessians. Fort Washington 
was renamed Ft. Knyphausen after it fell to Hessian forces commanded by 
Lieutenant General Knyphausen of the Hessian Corps. However, American 
military historians have not taken discussion of the Hessians much beyond 
the aforementioned, nor made any attempt to adequately evaluate their 
contribution to the British war effort. 
Prominent Revolutionary historian John Shy, formerly of the University 
ofMichigan, in his A People Numerous andAnned: Reflections on the Military 
Struggle for Independence (1976) made mention of the Hessians only six 
times. He stated nothing beyond the facts that England hired "German 
mercenaries," that the Hessians served with the British anny, and that a 
contingent of them was defeated at the battle of Bennington, 1777.20 In fact, 
most of the older authorities on the military history of the Revolution had 
even less to say regarding Hessian participation. Howard H. Peckham, in his 
The War for Independence: A Military History (1958), mentioned only the 
"hiring" of the Hessian forces, their presence in Howe's expedition to New 
York in 1776, the defeat at Trenton, and "as for the German mercenaries [at the 
end of the war], only 17,300 of the 30,000 employed went home; 7,500 had 
died, and 5,000 had deserted to remain in a country and a society which they 
saw were so superior to their own."ZI In like manner, Willard M Wallace's 
Appeal to Arms: A Military History of the American Revolution briefly 
discussed the negotiations between Britain and the German princes, the 
presence of Hessians in the battle of Long Island, the defeat at Trenton, and 
their continued presence within the British army for the duration of the war. 2Z 
Again, there was no appraisal or judgment whatsoever concerning the nature 
of the Hessian contribution to the British war effort. 
While Christopher Ward's The War of the Revolution (2 vols., 1952), 
mentioned Hessian participation a great deal more than Shy, Peckham, and 
Wallace, there still was no serious assessment or evaluation of Hessian 
contribution beyond the facts that Great Britain hired a substantial number of 
these.auxiliaries, that 8,000 Hessians were part of the British camp on Staten 
Island in 1776, that they were present in the campaign that year (a garrison of 
them being defeated at Trenton that Christmas), and that they were a continual 
presence throughout the duration of the war, in the battles of Long Island, 
Fort Washington, Brandywine, White Plains, Newport, and Charleston. Ward's 
lengthy discussion of Brandywine makes no mention of the fact that it was 
none other than Captain Ewald, as we learn from his diary, who led the Howe! 
Cornwallis column around Washington's left flank. Additionally, nowhere in 
Ward's two volumes are the Hessians mentioned as playing a significant or 
even decisive role in the combat. 
'," ....,..,_*_.~~,~ _ 
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The only Revolutionary historian to make any evaluation whatsoever 
concerning Hessian participation is Don Higgenbotham, fonnerly of the 
University of North Carolina, in his The War ofAmerican Independence: 
Military Attitudes. Policies, and Practice. 1763-1789 (1971). Yet while 
Higgenbotham reluctantly concedes that some of the German regiments, 
particularly the Jager Corps, "compared favorably with the best in the British 
army" and "were effective in beating back American harassing parties," this is 
neither a serious attempt to assess their importance to the British army nor a 23 
thorough evaluation of their overall contribution to the British war effort. 
Indeed, from a thorough study of the existing military histories of the 
American Revolution, it would seem that the Hessian forces contributed 
virtually nothing ofsignificance to the British war effort in America. We can 
clearly see that the Hessian forces were present, but we do not observe any 
awareness of a significant role played by them or any importance of the 
Hessians to the British army in America. These historians will concede that 
the Hessians added numerical strength to the British forces, but they have 
not undertaken any serious evaluation ofHessian contribution or significance 
in the warJor America. 
Hence, are we to conclude that Hessian participation waS insignificant? 
The diary of Captain Johann Ewald replies resoundingly to the negative. By 
adding the diary of Captain Ewald to the existing literature of the American 
Revolution, we can remedy this serious case of oversight on the part of 
Revolutionary historians. In examining Ewald's diary, students of the 
Revolution can understand the considerable importance of the Hessian Jager 
Corps to the British army in America. 
Captain Johann Ewald and the Field Jager Corps in America 
The Jagers were the elite of the Hessian Corps, often called "chasseurs" 
by the British and Americans.24 They were a small unit of elite light infantry 
troops who drew their rank and file from among huntsmen, for~sters, 
gameskeepers, and others who were experts at shooting. In the American war, 
the Hessian Jagers ~erved both mounted and on foot, and were equipped with 
rifled weapons. Unlike the British light infantry, the Jagers were not equipped 
with bayonets, and thus faced the danger ofbeing spitted in a bayonet charge. 
Consequently, if the Jagers were not working directly with light infantry, they 
were combined with bodies ofHessian grenadiers doing service as light troops. 
Additionally, unlike soldiers offield and garrison regiments, the Jagers "had 
to be men of sufficient reliance and intelligence" to work in smaller units 25 
engaged in scouting and patrolling, as they so often did in America. More 
importantly though, the Jagers were volunteers and professionals. And 
,., 
although the Jagers numbered slightly over 1,000 troops, the Ewald diary 
reveals that they perfonned duties that were quite disproportionate to their 
small numbers. 
Constructing The Past 
There were two Jager companies sent to America in 1776, the 2nd Jager 
Company being commanded by Captain Johann Ewald. From the outset ofhis 
diary, which began with the departure ofthe troops from Hesse, we can clearly 
see the importance of Ewald and the Jager Corps to the army of General 
William Howe. Shortly after arriving ofT Sandy Hook on 22 October 1776, 
Captain Ewald received orders to "march at once to headquarters," where he 
was "delighted with the message, for ... I wished for nothing more than to get 
to know the enemy.,,26 The bulk of the British army was to take Long Island 
that day, and the Jagers and light infantry were to occupy the village of 
Flatbush. During the battle, however, there was a miscommunication between 
Ewald and Captain Wreden, commander of the 1st Jager Company. Ewald 
mistakenly advanced his company upon several battalions of American 
riflemen in Major General Charles Lee's division, whereupon Colonel von 
Donop had to come to his aid with a battalion of English light infantry with 
two field pieces, "whose bayonets and grapeshot provided the precious air 
by which [Ewald] was saved.,,27 
After ~e engagement, Ewald received a "sharp reprimand" from the 
Commanding General of the Hessian forces, General von Heister, who was 
presumably upset that his elite unit could have erred in such a way. Ewald 
went on to record, however, that General Howe, "who apparently noticed that 
the Hessian general must have said something unpleasant to me, expressed 
his satisfaction to me through one ofhis adjutants," a compliment repeated in 
the order ofthe anny the following day, which also said: "It is to be regretted 
that so many bravejagers have been sacrificed through a misunderstanding.,,28 
Thus, even after Ewald's first engagement on the American continent, the 
Commanding General ofthe British Army had expressed satisfaction with his 
conduct. 
When the British army marched on 23 October to prepare for the attack 
.. upon Ft. Washington29, Ewald recorded that "it was decided [from this day 
on] that the Donop Jager Company should constantly cover the right wing [of 
the army] and I with my company the left wing. Moreover, when the anny 
marched in wing fonnation, or in two columns, a jager company was to serve 
as the advance guard," a duty which they performed for the duration of theJO 
war. Certainly, the Jagers were a capable force if they had been entrusted 
with the safety ofGeneral Howe's army when on the march. 
Indeed, throughout the rest of the 1776 campaign and into 1777, Ewald 
and the Jagers were constantly engaged with distinction. In the attack upon 
White Plains, 27 October 1776, the left column of the British force had 
encountered an advanced corps ofAmericans, "which [Ewald] had to engage 
supported by the light infantry."J) When the larger Hessian contingent had J2
captured Chatterton Hill and the Americans had given way, Howe disrupted 
Washington's efforts to set up and fortify his encampment "by the fire of the 
jagers and light infantry."JJ 
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importantly though, the Jagers were volunteers and professionals. And 
although the Jagers numbered slightly over 1,000 troops, the Ewald diary 
reveals that they perfonned duties that were quite disproportionate to their 
small numbers. 
Constructing The Past 
There were two Jager companies sent to America in 1776, the 2nd Jager 
Company being commanded by Captain Johann Ewald. From the outset ofhis 
diary, which began with the departure ofthe troops from Hesse, we can clearly 
see the importance of Ewald and the Jager Corps to the anny of General 
William Howe. Shortly after arriving ofT Sandy Hook on 22 October 1776, 
Captain Ewald received orders to "march at once to headquarters," where he 
was "delighted with the message, for ... I wished for nothing more than to get 
to know the enemy.,,26 The bulk of the British army was to take Long Island 
that day, and the Jagers and light infantry were to occupy the village of 
Flatbush. During the battle, however, there was a miscommunication between 
Ewald and Captain Wreden, commander of the lst Jager Company. Ewald 
mistakenly advanced his company upon several battalions of American 
riflemen in Major General Charles Lee's division, whereupon Colonel von 
Donop had to come to his aid with a battalion of English light infantry with 
two field pieces, "whose bayonets and grapeshot provided the precious air 
by which [Ewald] was saved.,,27 
After !he engagement, Ewald received a "sharp reprimand" from the 
Commanding General of the Hessian forces, General von Heister, who was 
presumably upset that his elite unit could have erred in such a way. Ewald 
went on to record, however, that General Howe, "who apparently noticed that 
the Hessian general must have said something unpleasant to me, expressed 
his satisfaction to me through one ofhis adjutants," a compliment repeated in 
the order of the anny the following day, which also said: "It is to be regretted 
that so many brave jagers have been sacrificed through a misunderstanding. ,,28 
Thus, even after Ewald's first engagement on the American continent, the 
Commanding General ofthe British Anny had expressed satisfaction with his 
conduct. 
When the British army marched on 23 October to prepare for the attack 
.' upon Ft. Washington29, Ewald recorded that "it was decided [from this day 
on] that the Donop Jager Company should constantly cover the right wing [of 
the army] and I with my company the left wing. Moreover, when the anny 
marched in wing fonnation, or in two columns, a jager company was to serve 
as the advance guard," a duty which they perfonned for the duration of the 
war. JO Certainly, the Jagers were a capable force if they had been entrusted 
with the safety ofGeneral Howe's army when on the march. 
Indeed, throughout the rest of the 1776 campaign and into 1777, Ewald 
and the Jagers were constantly engaged with distinction. In the attack upon 
White Plains, 27 October 1776, the left column of the British force had 
encountered an advanced corps ofAmericans, "which [Ewald] had to engage 
supported by the light infantry."J) When the larger Hessian contingent had 32
captured Chatterton Hill and the Americans had given way, Howe disrupted 
Washington's efforts to set up and fortify his encampment "by the fire of the 
jagers and light infantry."J] 
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In preparation for the British attack upon Fort Washington one week 
later, Ewald was "cordially asked by Colonel Donop" to conduct the initial 34
reconnaissance. After the fort had fallen to British and Hessian forces and 
was renamed Fort Knyphausen~ General Washington crossed the Hudson 
River and occupied Fort Lee. 5 Shortly thereafter, the Hessian Jagers, 
grenadiers, and five English brigades under Lord Cornwallis invaded New 
Jersey. While on the march, Ewald fell upon and engaged a force ofAmericans, 
and "quickly sent back a jager to fetch more men, but instead of the jagers, I 
received an order from Lord Cornwallis to return at once." When Ewald returned 
and informed Cornwallis of what he had discovered, the general replied "Let 
them go, my dear Ewald, and stay here. We do not want to lose any men. One 
jager is worth more than ten rebels.,,36 Indeed, this remark by Cornwallis reveals 
the high esteem in which the Jagers were held and their value to the British 
anny. 
Likewise, further gestures by Cornwal1is reveal the value of the Hessian 
Jagers to the British army. On 9 January 1777 Cornwallis visited Ewald's 
advanced post, and when he found the Jagers "very cheerful despite their 
ragged clothing and hard duty, he ordered [Ewald] to assure [them] ... that 
each jager would be clothed at [Cornwal1is' s] expense.,,37 Two weeks later, the 
promised clothing arrived from Cornwal1is, "which consisted of a complete 
uniform for each man. ,,38 Several days later and after another engagement in 
which Ewald's Jagers fought bravely, Cornwallis "honored me by publishing 
an order expressing his satisfaction with me and my courageous men, and 
each jager received a gift ofone piaster.,,39 . 
On 12 February Ewald received orders to report to headquarters, "where 
Lord Cornwallis showed his confidence in me by entrusting me with drawing 
up a plan for a surprise attack on Bound Brook," an attack which due to the 40
weather was postponed until spring. This gesture by Cornwallis again 
evidenced Ewald's great value to the army, and more, evidenced his capability 
as a soldier as a British general was entrusting a company commander with 
the task ofdevising battle plans. Additionally, the attack was a success when 
carried out two months later. On 12 April, Ewald and a detachment of thirty 
Jagers drove the numerically superior force ofAmericans at Bound Brook into 
a field fort, which was fina~11 taken from the rear by a larger body of troops 
under General James Grant. 
During Howe's campaign of 1777, the Hessian Jagers were included amona 
the expeditionary force while many ofthe other Hessian units were left behind. 
Ewald's Jager company distinguished itself on numerous occasions during 
this campaign. Additionally, the Jagers under the command of Ewald and 
Captain Wreden formed the advanced guard and marched at the head of the 
British army at all times. On the march toward Iron Hill, Maryland on 3 
September 1777 Ewald was again given the advanced guard, "whereupon the 
1
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Commanding General [Howe] recommended the greatest caution." After the 
charge was sounded, "the enemy was attacked so severely and with such 
spirit by the jagers that we became masters of the mountain after a seven hour 
engagement."43 The Jager companies played such a leading part in the rout of 
the American troops that Ewald and the other officers of the Jager Corps 
"received the following expression of thanks from the Commander in Chief' 
on orders: 
The courageous manner in which ... the entire personnel of the Jager 
Corps, defeated yesterday the picked troops ofthe enemy ... deserves 
the highest praise and the fullest acknowledgment ofthe Commander 
in Chief, and has attracted the greatest admiration of the entire army.44 
Likewise, in the attack upon Brandywine one week later, Ewald and th'e 
Jagers were again at the forefront of the attack. Ewald recorded that it was he 
personally who led the Cornwal1is column around Washington's right wing.45 
After the battle ofBrandywine46, both Ewald and Wreden were decorated with 
the Hessian Knight Order pour fa vertu militaire, an award given for their 
distinguished conduct. Indeed, this was a great honor for the two men, "as 
they were the first officers ofthe rank ofcaptain to be thus distinguished."47 In 
fact, Ewald left so favorable an impression upon Lord Cornwallis that when the 
latter left the army to return to England in December 1777, Ewald received from 
him the following letter: 
Sir. 
I cannot leave this country without desiring you to accept my best 
thanks for your good services during the two Campaigns in which) 
have had the honour to command the Hessian Chasseurs. If the war 
should continue,) hope we shall again serve together. Ifwe should be 
separated, I shall ever remember the distinguished merit and Ability's 
[sic] ofCaptain Ewald.48 
In addition, General Howe, upon being relieved by General Clinton in 
May 1778, wrote a comparable letter to both Ewald and Wreden on his 
departure: 
Gentlemen:
 
Please allow me to bear witness, before my departure, to the extreme
 
satisfaction I have always had in your distinguished conduct in the
 
two campaigns during which I have had the honor to command you.
 
The conduct of the two premier companies of Hessian chasseurs,
 
incited by the zeal and brave example oftheir chiefs - you gentlemen
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In preparation for the British attack upon Fort Washington one week 
later, Ewald was "cordially asked by Colonel Donop" to conduct the initial 34
reconnaissance. After the fort had fallen to British and Hessian forces and 
was renamed Fort Knyphausen~ General Washington crossed the Hudson 
River and occupied Fort Lee. S Shortly thereafter, the Hessian Jagers, 
grenadiers, and five English brigades under Lord Cornwallis invaded ;New 
Jersey. While on the march, Ewald fell upon and engaged a force ofAmericans, 
and "quickly sent back a jager to fetch more men, but instead of the jagers, I 
received an order from Lord Cornwallis to return at once." When Ewald returned 
and informed Cornwallis ofwhat he had discovered, the general replied "Let 
them go, my dear Ewald, and stay here. We do not want to lose any men. One 
jager is worth more than ten rebels.,,36 Indeed, this remark by Cornwallis reveals 
the high esteem in which the Jagers were held and their value to the British 
army. 
Likewise, further gestures by Cornwallis reveal the value of the Hessian 
Jagers to the British anny. On 9 January 1777 Cornwallis visited Ewald's 
advanced post, and when he found the Jagers "very cheerful despite their 
ragged clothing and hard duty, he ordered [Ewald] to assure [them] ... that 
eachjager would be clothed at [Cornwallis's] expense.,,37 Two weeks later, the 
promised clothing arrived from Cornwallis, "which consisted of a complete 
uniform for each man.,,38 Several days later and after another engagement in 
which Ewald's Jagers fought bravely, Cornwallis "honored me by publishing 
an order expressing his satisfaction with me and my courageous men, and 
each jager received a gift ofone piaster.,,39 
On 12 February Ewald received orders to report to headquarters, "where 
Lord Cornwallis showed his confidence in me by entrusting me with drawing 
up a plan for a surprise attack on Bound Brook," an attack which due to the40
weather was postponed until spring. This gesture by Cornwallis again 
evidenced Ewald's great value to the anny, and more, evidenced his capability 
as a soldier as a British general was entrusting a company commander with 
the task ofdevising battle plans. Additionally, the attack was a success when 
carried out two months later. On 12 April, Ewald and a detachment of thirty 
Jagers drove the numerically superior force ofAmericans at Bound Brook into 
a field fort, which was fina~11 taken from the rear by a larger body of troops 
under General James Grant. 
During Howe's campaign of 1777, the Hessian Jagers were included amona 
the expeditionary force while many ofthe other Hessian units were left behind. 
Ewald's Jager company distinguished itself on numerous occasions during 
this campaign. Additionally, the Jagers under the command of Ewald and 
Captain Wreden formed the advanced guard and marched at the head of the 
British army at all times. On the march toward Iron Hill, Maryland on 3 
September 1777 Ewald was again given the advanced guard, "whereupon the 
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Commanding General [Howe] recommended the greatest caution." After the 
charge was sounded, "the enemy was attacked so severely and with such 
spirit by the jagers that we became masters of the mountain after a seven hour 
engagement. '>43 The Jager companies played such a leading part in the rout of 
the American troops that Ewald and the other officers of the Jager Corps 
"received the following expression of thanks from the Commander in Chief' 
on orders: 
The courageous manner in which ... the entire personnel of the Jager 
Corps, defeated yesterday the picked troops ofthe enemy ... deserves 
the highest praise and the fullest acknowledgment of the Commander 
in Chief, and has attracted the greatest admiration ofthe entire anny.44 
Likewise, in the attack upon Brandywine one week later, Ewald and th'e 
Jagers were again at the forefront of the attack. Ewald recorded that it was he 
personally who led the Cornwallis column around Washington's right wing.4s 
After the battle ofBrandywine46, both Ewald and Wreden were decorated with 
the Hessian Knight Order pour fa vertu militaire, an award given for their 
distinguished conduct. Indeed, this was a great honor for the two men, "as 
they were the first officers of the rank ofcaptain to be thus distinguished."47 In 
fact, Ewald left so favorable an impression upon Lord Cornwallis that when the 
latter left the army to return to England in December 1777, Ewald received from 
him the following letter: 
Sir. 
I cannot leave this country without desiring you to accept my best 
thanks for your good services during the two Campaigns in which I 
have had the honour to command the Hessian Chasseurs. If the war 
should continue, I hope we shall again serve together. Ifwe should be 
separated, I shall everrememberthe distinguished merit and Ability's 
[sic] ofCaptain Ewald.48 
In addition, General Howe, upon being relieved by General Clinton in 
May 1778, wrote a comparable letter to both Ewald and Wreden on his 
departure: 
Gentlemen:
 
Please allow me to bear witness, before my departure, to the extreme
 
satisfaction I have always had in your distinguished conduct in the
 
two campaigns during which I have had the honor to command you.
 
The conduct of the two premier companies of Hessian chasseurs,
 
incited by the zeal and brave example oftheir chiefs - you gentlemen
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- has been noticed by the entire army, and made such an unforgettable 
., 49ImpressIon on me.... 
When the British withdrew from Philadelphia on 19 December 1778, Ewald 
and the Jagers frustrated an American attempt to break down several bridges 
and delay the march ofClinton's army. After fmding two beams still remaining 
on one of the bridges, Ewald immediately crossed over with the advanced 
guard ofeighty Jagers "to take post on the other side ... by which the workmen 
were protected."50 He then discovered another brid8e "on which people were 
working to destroy it" and quickly "let fly in earnest" a concentrated volume of 
fire on the enemy, whereupon "they abandoned the bridge and ran away into' 
the nearest wood."51 After the bridges had been repaired, al10wing the British 
to withdraw, Ewald "received from the Commander in Chiefhis thanks and the 
compliment that I had saved the army a longer march by my diligence."52 
In December 1779, while the British army prepared for its expedition to the 
south, Ewald reported to headquarters to find out the details of the approaching 
embarkation. Upon meeting General Knyphausen, then the Commanding General 
of the Hessian forces, Ewald heard the following words: "General Clinton and 
Lord Cornwallis request you for the approaching expedition," at which point 
Ewald "jumped for joy, hurried to the Corps with my orders, and readied myself 
for the march."53 Again, for the Commander in Chief of the British forces to 
personally request the services ofCaptain Ewald in the approaching.expedition 
tel1s us a great deal about the excellent capability of this officer and his troops. 
Ewald's Jager company and that of Captain Johann Hinrichs further 
distinguished themselves at the siege of Charleston in 1780. Ewald took it 
upon himselfto have the Jagers fire rifle shots "at a communication consisting 
of palisades."54 After he "observed with astonishment the effect of the rifle 
shots ... [he] decided to shoot at the embrasures. At sunset the Commander in 
Chief came into the trenches and took the firing in very good part, since the 
men had asserted the fire of the besieged on this side had become weaker ... 
."55 At times, the Jagers "kept entire sections of [American] guns so warm that 
often not a shot was fired by the enemy for hours."56 After Charleston fell to 
the British, "the besieged tried to conceal their losses, but one officer told 
[Ewald] that the largest number had been killed by rifle bul1ets."57 
In Benedict Arnold's raiding expedition to Portsmouth, Virginia, Ewald 
and the Jagers were given the task ofdefending an important causeway. When 
the Americans advanced and the situation grew a bit precarious, General Arnold 
panicked and asked Ewald if the enemy would possibly take the post. Ewald 
wrote: "The question annoyed me, for he could see it all for himself. - I said, 
'No! As long as one jager lives, no damned American will come across the 
causeway!'''58 Ewald and the Jagers defended Arnold's small post for four 
hours against a superior enemy force. Eventually the Americans gave up the 
r. 
action and hastily withdrew. Ewald "rejoiced over the magnificent behavior of 
my brave jagers, who with all eclat had thus distinguished themselves before 
the eyes ofthe English. For surely one jager had fought against thirty Americans 
today." Once again, he earned a British general's acknowledgment of the 
"excellent conduct" of his Jagers on orders.59 
Captain Ewald received commendation not only from British generals but 
also from the Commanding General of the Hessian forces, General Wilhelm 
Freiherr Knyphausen. On 21 March 1781 Ewald received a letter from General 
Knyphausen which stated: 
I cannot fail to take pleasure in mentioning the special trust which I 
have always placed in your wel1-known ability and bravery, which 
has been justified by the lauding example that you gave of it in your 
conduct of the affair on the 19th ofMarch. Such an example by you 
and your detachment resounds to the greatest honor and has received 
the complete satisfaction ofthe Commanding General and the Arrny.60 
In the final Virginia campaign, Ewald served with Colonel John Graves 61Simcoe, commander of the Queen's Rangers. The two became good friends 
and their corps worked together splendidly, in fact so splendidly that the 
fol1owing commendation was issued on 27 June 1781: 
Lord Cornwallis desires that Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe will accept 
[the] warmest Acknowledgment for his judicious and spirited Conduct 
... [and] likewise desires that Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe will 
communicate his best thanks to Captain Ewald, to the Detachment of 
the Yagers [sic] and to the Officers and Soldiers of the Queens 
Rangers. 62 
Simcoe, writing to Knyphausen to commend Ewald's service, called him 
"that most excellent officer."63 In fact, Ewald recorded how "this worthy man" 
had in July 1781 said that "he wished that I would accept the major's berth in 
the Ranger Corps .... But I am Hessian, body and soul, and it seems to me that 
I could not be happy outside this splendid corps in which I serve."64 
Ewald and Simcoe were both trapped with Cornwallis at Yorktown, and 
Ewald's company was down to a sixth of its original strength when Cornwallis 
surrendered on 17 October 1781, thereby bringing victory to the rebellious 
American colonies. Shortly after the siege ended, however, Ewald "had the 
pleasure and honor ofbeing invited to dine with the general officers," including 
Washington, Comte de Rochambeau, the Marquis de Lafayette.6~ Also, as a 
prisoner ofwar on Long Island, Ewald received a letter with an enclosure from 
General Knyphausen, containing an extract of a letter from "his Serene 
Highness," the Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel himself, which read: 
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When the British withdrew from Philadelphia on 19 December 1778, Ewald 
and the Jagers frustrated an American attempt to break down several bridges 
and delay the march ofClinton's anny. After fmding two beams still remaining 
on one of the bridges, Ewald immediately crossed over with the advanced 
guard ofeighty Jagers "to take post on the other side ... by which the workmen 
were protected."50 He then discovered another bridge "on which people were 
working to destroy it" and quickly "let fly in earnest" a concentrated volume of 
fire on the enemy, whereupon "they abandoned the bridge and ran away into . 
the nearest wood."51 After the bridges had been repaired, allowing the British 
to withdraw, Ewald "received from the Commander in Chiefhis thanks and the 
compliment that I had saved the anny a longer march by my diligence."52 
In December 1779, while the British anny prepared for its expedition to the 
south, Ewald reported to headquarters to find out the details ofthe approaching 
embarkation. Upon meeting General Knyphausen, then the Commanding General 
of the Hessian forces, Ewald heard the following words: "General Clinton and 
Lord Cornwallis request you for the approaching expedition," at which point 
Ewald "jumped for joy, hurried to the Corps with my orders, and readied myself 
for the march."53 Again, for the Commander in Chief of the British forces to 
personally request the services ofCaptain Ewald in the approaching.expedition 
tells us a great deal about the excellent capability of this officer and his troops. 
Ewald's Jager company and that of Captain Johann Hinrichs further 
distinguished themselves at the siege of Charleston in 1780. Ewald took it 
upon himselfto have the Jagers ftre rifle shots "at a communication consisting 
of palisades."54 After he "observed with astonishment the effect of the rifle 
shots ... [he] decided to shoot at the embrasures. At sunset the Commander in 
Chief came into the trenches and took the ftring in very good part, since the 
men had asserted the fire of the besieged on this side had become weaker ... 
."55 At times, the Jagers "kept entire sections of[American] guns so wann that 
often not a shot was frred by the enemy for hours."56 After Charleston fell to 
the British, "the besieged tried to conceal their losses, but one officer told 
[Ewald] that the largest number had been killed by rifle bullets."57 
In Benedict Arnold's raiding expedition to Portsmouth, Virginia, Ewald 
and the Jagers were given the task ofdefending an important causeway. When 
the Americans advanced and the situation grew a bit precarious, General Arnold 
panicked and asked Ewald if the enemy would possibly take the post. Ewald 
wrote: 'The question annoyed me, for he could see it all for himself. - I said, 
'No! As long as one jager lives, no damned American will come across the 
causeway!"'58 Ewald and the Jagers defended Arnold's small post for four 
hours against a superior enemy force. Eventually the Americans gave up the 
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action and hastily withdrew. Ewald "rejoiced over the magnificent behavior of 
my brave jagers, who with all eclat had thus distinguished themselves before 
the eyes ofthe English. For surely one jager had fought against thirty Americans 
today." Once again, he earned a British general's acknowledgment of the 
"excellent conduct" of his Jagers on orders.59 
Captain Ewald received commendation not only from British generals but 
also from the Commanding General of the Hessian forces, General Wilhelm 
Freiherr Knyphausen. On 21 March 1781 Ewald received a letter from General 
Knyphausen which stated: 
I cannot fail to take pleasure in mentioning the special trust which I 
have always placed in your well-known ability and bravery, which 
has been justified by the lauding example that you gave of it in your 
conduct of the affair on the 19th ofMarch. Such an example by you 
and your detachment resounds to the greatest honor and has received 
the complete satisfaction ofthe Commanding General and the Anny.60 
In the final Virginia campaign, Ewald served with Colonel John Graves 
Simcoe, commander of the Queen's Rangers.61 The two became good friends 
and their cOIl'S worked together splendidly, in fact so splendidly that the 
following commendation was issued on 27 June 1781: 
Lord Cornwallis desires that Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe will accept 
[the] wannest Acknowledgment for his judicious and spirited Conduct 
... [and] likewise desires that Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe will 
communicate his best thanks to Captain Ewald, to the Detachment of 
the Yagers [sic] and to the Officers and Soldiers of the Queens 
Rangers.62 
Simcoe, writing to Knyphausen to commend Ewald's service, called him 
"that most excellent officer."63 In fact, Ewald recorded how "this worthy man" 
had in July 1781 said that "he wished that I would accept the major's berth in 
the Ranger Corps .... But I am Hessian, body and soul, and it seems to me that 
I could not be happy outside this splendid corps in which I serve."64 
Ewald and Simcoe were both trapped with Cornwallis at Yorktown, and 
Ewald's company was down to a sixth of its original strength when Cornwallis 
surrendered on 17 October 1781, thereby bringing victory to the rebellious 
American colonies. Shortly after the siege ended, however, Ewald "had the 
pleasure and honor ofbeing invited to dine with the general officers," including 
Washington, Comte de Rochambeau, the Marquis de Lafayette.6s Also, as a 
prisoner ofwar on Long Island, Ewald received a letter with an enclosure from 
General Knyphausen, containing an extract of a letter from "his Serene 
Highness," the Landgrave ofHesse-Kassel himself, which read: 
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Among the reports reaching me is that of the ... fme conduct of 
Captain Ewald of the Jager Corps, which is altogether pleasing to 
learn. 
The Lieutenant General,66 therefore, desires to declare to ... Captain 
Ewald, my extraordinary satisfaction and the assurance ofmy entirely 
special favor and grace.67 
Indeed, as evidenced by Ewald's accounts ofhis exploits over the duration 
of the war, we can clearly observe the indispensability of Captain Ewald and 
the Jager Corps to the British army in America. The Jagers were employed to 
great advantage and their conduct did not go unnoticed, evidenced by the 
numerous commendations they were given and the many favorable letters 
which Captain Ewald received from the British generals. Furthermore, oftwenty­
five Hessian officers decorated with the order pour la vertu militaire in the 
war, five belonged to the Jager Corps: Ewald, Wreden, Captain Philip von 
Wurmb, Lieutenant Colonel Carl von Prueschenk, and Colonel Ludwig von 
Wurmb.6~ Thus by examining Ewald's diary we can clearly see the need to 
revise the standing military histories of the Revolution to include the 
contribution of Ewald and the Jagers, as they were certainly a force of great 
importance to the army ofGreat Britain. 
Captain Ewald and the American Experience 
The diary ofCaptain Ewald reveals not only the importance of the Hessian 
Jager Corps to the British army, but also gives students of the American 
Revolution a first-hand look at the partisan and irregular nature of the war. 
In theAmerican War, the Jagers participated in a military struggle that was 
very different from those they had seen in Western Europe, where war, including 
irregular war, was waged by professional soldiers, members of the regular 
forces. In America, the situation was much different. Here they experienced 
light infantry war not only against Continental regulars (permanent members 
of the field army) but also against the part-time citizen soldiery of the militia, 
"armed farmers" as Ewald described them, an "irregular" war by regulars against 
true irregulars.69 Although the colonists lacked a standing army and were thus 
militarily the weaker side, they raised the concept of irregular warfare to a new 
level.70 
Ewald was certainly not one to disparage the effectiveness of the colonial 
militia in this partisan war, however. After receiving heavy casualties on several 
foraging expeditions in New Jersey in early 1777, the British commanders were 
forced to send out increasingly larger foraging parties. Ewald recognized the 
capability of the New Jersey militia by recording that "[s]ince the army would 
have been gradually destroyed through this foraging, from here on the forage 
1
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was procured from New York."71 In fact, after the war was over, Ewald 
remembered the determination of the militia in his own Treatise on Partisan 
Warfare (1785): 
Never have I seen [evasive] maneuvres [sic] performed better than by 
the American militia, and especially that ofthe Proviw" ' ''.11 Jersey. 
Ifyou were forced to retreat against these people yOlJ c~,uld certainly 
count on constantly having them around you.72 
We again witness the capability ofthe colonial militia as Ewald recounted 
the British army crossing from Philadelphia into New Jersey in June 1778. 
Ewald noted on 17 June that "the militia received us with sharp rifle fire" and 
"the skirmishing continued without letup."73 Likewise, on 2 December 1778 
Ewald recorded BrigadierGeneral Sir William Erskine's advance upon Tarrytown, 
New York, noting that Erskine's force had dislodged the colonial militia only 
after "a stubborn fight."74 Ewald further recorded on 29 October 1779 that his 
"very good friend Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe" of the Queen's Rangers had 
been "badly wounded in the Province ofJersey."75 Simcoe had taken a party of 
over two hundred to destroy several American weapons reserves in New Jersey 
and had succeeded in laying waste to one such magazine. "But as soon as the 
state militia learned of it," Ewald noted, they "shot down the majority of his 
men, and finally wounded and captured him."76 Ewald certainly acknowle4ged 
the capability of these "armed farmers" throughout his diary. 
The diary of Captain Ewald further illuminates the partisan nature of the 
war in America77 The War ofAmerican Independence was at once revolutionary 
and partisan in the very scope of the colonists' objective: to eliminate British 
power completely from the vast extent of the thirteen colonies.78 The war was 
also one of national liberation, which contributed to the partisan nature that 
Ewald recognized. 
For the Jagers it was often a war of outposts, and of smal1 detachments 
engaging regular troops as well as the "armed country people who are all 
excellent shots."79 Furthermore, we can see that the nature ofthe mili tary conflict 
in America was something quite new to the Jagers, as Ewald recorded how 
several ofhis officers "were young and inexperienced in this kind ofwarfare."80 
Nevertheless they adapted, and adapted well. 
As we can understand from Ewald's diary, the Jagers were employed as 
partisan troops for the majority oftheir time in America, even while they were 
still part of the overall war effort carried out by the regular British forces. 
Ewald's Jagers specialized in partisan operations in America, primarily in the 
ambuscade, or ambush. They frequently operated as detachments and small 
parties sent out "to armoy the enemy," and were employed to remarkable 
advantage in reconnaissance missions, patrol duties, and in protecting foraging 
parties.81 
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Among the reports reaching me is that of the ... fme conduct of 
Captain Ewald of the Jager Corps, which is altogether pleasing to 
learn. 
The Lieutenant General,66 therefore, desires to declare to ... Captain 
Ewald, my extraordinary satisfaction and the assurance ofmy entirely 
special favor and grace.67 
Indeed, as evidenced by Ewald's accounts ofhis exploits over the duration 
of the war, we can clearly observe the indispensability ofCaptain Ewald and 
the Jager Corps to the British army in America. The Jagers were employed to 
great advantage and their conduct did not go unnoticed, evidenced by the 
numerous commendations they were given and the many favorable letters 
which Captain Ewald received from the British generals. Furthermore, oftwenty­
five Hessian officers decorated with the order pour la vertu militaire in the 
war, five belonged to the Jager Corps: Ewald, Wreden, Captain Philip von 
Wurmb, Lieutenant Colonel Carl von Prueschenk, and Colonel Ludwig von 
Wurmb.6~ Thus by examining Ewald's diary we can clearly see the need to 
revise the standing military histories of the Revolution to include the 
contribution of Ewald and the Jagers, as they were certainly a force of great 
importance to the anny ofGreat Britain. 
Captain Ewald and the American Experience 
The diary ofCaptain Ewald reveals not only the importance ofthe Hessian 
Jager Corps to the British army, but also gives students of the American 
Revolution a first-hand look at the partisan and irregular nature of the war. 
In the American War, the Jagers participated in a military struggle that was 
very different from those they had seen in Western Europe, where war, including 
irregular war, was waged by professional soldiers, members of the regular 
forces. In America, the situation was much different. Here they experienced 
light infantry war not only against Continental regulars (permanent members 
of the field army) but also against the part-time citizen soldiery of the militia, 
"armed farmers" as Ewald described them, an "irregular" war by regulars against 
true irregulars.69 Although the colonists lacked a standing army and were thus 
militarily the weaker side, they raised the concept of irregular warfare to a new 
levepo 
Ewald was certainly not one to disparage the effectiveness of the colonial 
militia in this partisan war, however. After receiving heavy casualties on several 
foraging expeditions in New Jersey in early 1777, the British commanders were 
forced to send out increasingly larger foraging parties. Ewald recognized the 
capability of the New Jersey militia by recording that "[s]ince the anny would 
have been gradually destroyed through this foraging, from here on the forage 
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was procured from New York."71 In fact, after the war was over, Ewald 
remembered the determination of the militia in his own Treatise on Partisan 
Waifare (1785): 
Never have I seen [evasive] maneuvres [sic] performed better than by 
the American militia, and especially that ofthe Proviw' ,., w Jersey. 
Ifyou were forced to retreat against these people yOlJ c~Juld certainly 
count on constantly having them around you.72 
We again witness the capability of the colonial militia as Ewald recounted 
the British army crossing from Philadelphia into New Jersey in June 1778. 
Ewald noted on 17 June that "the militia received us with sharp rifle fire" and 
"the skirmishing continued without letup."73 Likewise, on 2 December 1778 
Ewald recorded BrigadierGeneral Sir William Erskine's advance upon Tarrytown, 
New York, noting that Erskine's force had dislodged the colonial militia only 
after "a stubborn fight."74 Ewald further recorded on 29 October 1779 that his 
"very good friend Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe" of the Queen's Rangers had 
been "badly wounded in the Province ofJersey."7S Simcoe had taken a party of 
over two hundred to destroy several American weapons reserves in New Jersey 
and had succeeded in laying waste to one such magazine. "But as soon as the 
state militia learned of it," Ewald noted, they "shot down the majority of his 
men, and finally wounded and captured him."76 Ewald certainly acknowle4ged 
the capability of these "armed farmers" throughout his diary. 
The diary of Captain Ewald further illuminates the partisan nature of the 
war in America77 The War ofAmerican Independence was at once revolutionary 
and partisan in the very scope of the colonists' objective: to eliminate British 
power completely from the vast extent of the thirteen colonies.78 The war was 
also one of national liberation, which contributed to the partisan nature that 
Ewald recognized. 
For the Jagers it was often a war of outposts, and of small detachments 
engaging regular troops as well as the "armed country people who are all 
excellent shots."79 Furthermore, we can see that the nature ofthe military conflict 
in America was something quite new to the Jagers, as Ewald recorded how 
several ofhis officers "were young and inexperienced in this kind ofwarfare."80 
Nevertheless they adapted, and adapted well. 
As we can understand from Ewald's diary, the Jagers were employed as 
partisan troops for the majority oftheir time in America, even while they were 
still part of the overall war effort carried out by the regular British forces. 
Ewald's Jagers specialized in partisan operations in America, primarily in the 
ambuscade, or ambush. They frequently operated as detachments and small 
parties sent out "to armoy the enemy," and were employed to remarkable 
advantage in reconnaissance missions, patrol duties, and in protecting foraging 
parties.81 
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Ewald recognized this partisan war as such, and wrote of attempting to 
develop "my own theory ofpartisan warfare.'>82 He was not slow in recognizing, 
additionally, the extremely harsh and dangerous nature ofthe duty performed 
by the Jagers in America. From Ewald's many accounts, one can "perceive how 
dangerous is the service of light troops in this country."8J While the regular 
British army could enjoy a brief respite between engagements, Ewald noted 
that the partisan war "was carried on constantly in full force. Not a day passed 
in which the Jager Corps, the light infantry, and the Queen's Rangers were not 
alarmed, and several people of the parties killed, wounded, or captured."84 
Hence, Ewald recognized exceptional confidence "which a partisan needs for 
this ticklish trade."85 
And since in America the enemy could be anywhere, the lagers had to be 
able to confront him anywhere. Thus, the only way to find the increasingly 
evasive enemy was to search him out, to deprive him ofhis cover in the populace. 
Hence, Ewald recorded several instances where he resorted to bribing the 
locals, which usually resulted in their cooperation as guides or informants. 
Shortly before the battle ofWhite Plains in October 1776, Ewald recorded that 
a loyalist came to him and revealed the location ofan enemy provisions depot, 
but only "would guide me to it ifI would give him reward."86 Hence Ewald gave 
the man "a small recompense" and went off to headquarters with the 
information. 87 During the Virginia Campaign, Ewald frequently recorded using 
Negroes as guides and informants. Ewald also noted obtaining ~'a faithful 
Negro ... who for two guineas undertook to carry a letter from me to Lord 
Cornwallis."88 On one occasion, Ewald did not even have to pay for information, 
"when a loyal Negro informed [him] that one thousand Americans were lying 
in ambuscade" not far from where Ewald was patrolling. On another morning, 
Ewald recorded that "a Negro came running to me at top speed, who assured 
me that in would give him two gold guineas he would reveal something valuable 
to me."89 Captain Ewald "quickly opened [his] purse and handed him the money," 
whereupon his black friend informed him ofrecent American troop movements 
in the area.90 
Clearly, this was a war with dimensions unlike any the lagers had ever 
encountered in Europe. 
Ewald as a Diarist 
The diary ofCaptain Ewald is an significant contribution to the literature 
of the American Revolution not only because it reveals the usefulness of the 
Hessian Jagers to the British Army, but also because it sheds new light on 
several of the key historical issues of the struggle which eventually brought 
political independence to the American colonies. Moreover, a dimension is 
revealed here that is of rare perspective, as Ewald, by virtue of his position, 
witnessed and took part in considerably more action than the average officer. 
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Moreover, he was an astute observer and shows considerable shrewdness in 
his remarks. As a result, Ewald's diary indeed helps us to better understand the 
nature of the military contest that was the American Revolution. 
Ewald was in a very favorable position to comment, which adds 
considerable significance to his observations, not only because he was an 
officer in constant contact with those in the upper echelons of the British 
command structure, but more importantly because he was a company 
commander who actually led his troops in field operations and fought beside 
them. Hence, the view ofthe war that we get from the diary ofCaptain Ewald is 
of intrinsically more value to students of the Revolution than the letters and 
journals ofAdjutant General MajorCarl Baurmeister and those ofMajorGeneral 
Friedrich Riedesel and Baroness von Riedesel, which are the standard accounts 
concerning Hessian participation in the Revolutionary War and have been 
regarded as valuable source materials for quite some time. 
Major Baurmeister's journals, partly because of his position as an 
Adjutant General, the chief administrative officer of a major military unit, 
provides us with a view of the war that is somewhat removed from day-to-day 
action in the field, as Baurmeister was most likely at staffheadquarters while 
Captain Ewald was leading his jagers on field maneuvers. Moreover, as 
Baurmeister's writings were regularly sent back to Lieutenant General Baron 
Friedrich von lungkenn, minister of state and minister of war in Hesse, they 
lack the candor and veracity found within the diary ofCaptain Ewald, which 
was written only for him. 
Likewise, the correspondence and journals of Baron and Baroness von 
Riedesel have also been regarded as valuable source materials for nearly a 
century. However, these accounts are also very different from Ewald's account 
for two reasons. Fundamentally, Baron von Riedesel's rank of Major General 
ensured that he was removed from the kind ofaction seen by Captain Ewald. 
Secondly, theConvention Army, which consisted ofthe force ofBritish General 
John Burgoyne, ofwhich Riedesel's Brunswickers were a part, surrendered to 
General Horatio Gates at Saratoga in 1777. Hence, Riedesel actually participated 
in military engagements for only a fraction of the time of Ewald's service in 
America. 
The fact that Captain Ewald published his Treatise on Partisan Warfare 
almost immediately after his return from the American War is not only proofof 
his professionalism but also gives him greater credence as a diarist as well. 
Ewald's Treatise itself was an important contribution to the literature of 
eighteenth-century light infantry tactics. The work was even honored with 
the approval ofFrederick the Great ofPrussia. The difference with other light 
infantry manuals ofthe time, though, lies in the fact that Ewald's examples and 
anal~~es were to a large degree based on his experiences in the American 
War. 
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Ewald recognized this partisan war as such, and wrote of attempting to 
develop "my own theory ofpartisan warfare."82 He was not slow in recognizing, 
additionally, the extremely harsh and dangerous nature ofthe duty performed 
by the Jagers in America. From Ewald's many accounts, one can "perceive how 
dangerous is the service of light troops in this country."83 While the regular 
British anny could enjoy a brief respite between engagements, Ewald noted 
that the partisan war "was carried on constantly in full force. Not a day passed 
in which the Jager Corps, the light infantry, and the Queen's Rangers were not 
alanned, and several people of the parties kil1ed, wounded, or captured."84 
Hence, Ewald recognized exceptional confidence "which a partisan needs for 
this ticklish trade."85 
And since in America the enemy could be anywhere, the Jagers had to be 
able to confront him anywhere. Thus, the only way to find the increasingly 
evasive enemy was to search him out, to deprive him ofhis cover in the populace. 
Hence, Ewald recorded several instances where he resorted to bribing the 
locals, which usually resulted in their cooperation as guides or informants. 
Shortly before the battle ofWhite Plains in October 1776, Ewald recorded that 
a loyalist came to him and revealed the location ofan enemy provisions depot, 
but only "would guide me to it ifI would give him reward."86 Hence Ewald gave 
the man "a small recompense" and went off to headquarters with the 
information.87 During the Virginia Campaign, Ewald frequently recorded using 
Negroes as guides and informants. Ewald also noted obtaining ~'a faithful 
Negro ... who for two guineas undertook to carry a letter from me to Lord 
Comwallis."88 On one occasion, Ewald did not even have to pay for information, 
"when a loyal Negro informed [him] that one thousand Americans were lying 
in ambuscade" not far from where Ewald was patrolIing. On another morning, 
Ewald recorded that "a Negro came running to me at top speed, who assured 
me that ifI would give him two gold guineas he would reveal something valuable 
to me."89 Captain Ewald"quickly opened [his] purse and handed him the money," 
whereupon his black friend informed him ofrecent American troop movements 
in the area.90 
Clearly, this was a war with dimensions unlike any the Jagers had ever 
encountered in Europe. 
Ewald as a Diarist 
The diary ofCaptain Ewald is an significant contribution to the literature 
of the American Revolution not only because it reveals the usefulness of the 
Hessian Jagers to the British Army, but also because it sheds new light on 
several of the key historical issues of the struggle which eventually brought 
political independence to the American colonies. Moreover, a dimension is 
revealed here that is of rare perspective, as Ewald, by virtue of his position, 
witnessed and took part in considerably more action than the average officer. 
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Moreover, he was an astute observer and shows considerable shrewdness in 
his remarks. Asa result, Ewald's diary indeed helps us to better understand the 
nature of the military contest that was the American Revolution.. 
Ewald was in a very favorable position to comment, which adds 
considerable significance to his observations, not only because he was an 
officer in constant contact with those in the upper echelons of the British 
command structure, but more importantly because he was a company 
commander who actually led his troops in field operations and fought beside 
them. Hence, the view ofthe war that we get from the diary ofCaptain Ewald is 
of intrinsically more value to students of the Revolution than the letters and 
journals ofAdjutant General Major Carl Baurmeister and those ofMajorGeneral 
Friedrich Riedesel and Baroness von Riedesel, which are the standard accounts 
concerning Hessian participation in the Revolutionary War and have been 
regarded as valuable source materials for quite some time. 
Major Baurmeister's journals, partly because of his position as an 
Adjutant General, the chief administrative officer of a major military unit, 
provides us with a view of the war that is somewhat removed from day-to-day 
action in the field, as Baurmeister was most likely at staffheadquarters while 
Captain Ewald was leading his jagers on field maneuvers. Moreover, as 
Baurmeister's writings were regularly sent back to Lieutenant General Baron 
Friedrich von Jungkenn, minister of state and minister of war in Hesse, they 
lack the candor and veracity found within the diary ofCaptain Ewald, which 
was written only for him. 
Likewise, the correspondence and journals of Baron and Baroness von 
Riedesel have also been regarded as valuable source materials for nearly a 
century. However, these accounts are also very different from Ewald's account 
for two reasons. FundamentalIy, Baron von Riedesel's rank ofMajor General 
ensured that he was removed from the kind ofaction seen by Captain Ewald. 
Secondly, the Convention Army, which consisted ofthe force ofBritish General 
John Burgoyne, ofwhich Riedesel's Brunswickers were a part, surrendered to 
General Horatio Gates at Saratoga in 1777. Hence, Riedesel actually participated 
in military engagements for only a fraction of the time of Ewald's service in 
America. 
The fact that Captain Ewald published his Treatise on Partisan Warfare 
almost immediately after his return from the American War is not only proofof 
his professionalism but also gives him greater credence as a diarist as well. 
Ewald's Treatise itself was an important contribution to the literature of 
eighteenth-century light infantry tactics. The work was even honored with 
the approval ofFrederick the Great ofPrussia. The difference with other light 
infantry manuals ofthe time, though, lies in the fact that Ewald's examples and 
anal~~es were to a large degree based on his experiences in the American 
War. 
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Moreover, Ewald had a very distinguished career after the American War. 
In December 1785 Ewald was ordered by the new Landgrave in Hesse-Hanau 
to organize the Hanau Jager Corps. After he had received his discharge from 
the Hessian army in February 1788, Ewald entered active service in Denmark, 
which at that time was at war with Sweden. Soon after his arrival, Ewald 
organized the Schleswig Jager Corps, which he levied and commanded with 
the rank oflieutenant colonel. In 1790 Ewald was elevated to Danish nobility, 
promoted to colonel in 1795, and to major general in 1802. He also founded a 
corps library and wrote and published three more military treatises. Ewald also 
fought valiantly during the Napoleonic wars, which resulted in his promotion 
to lieutenant general in 1809 and commanding general ofthe Duchy ofHolstein 
in 1812. He retired from active duty on I May 1813, after fifty-three years of 
military service.92 
Thus, Ewald's diary is ofparticular value not only because it helps students 
of the Revolution understand the significant contribution of the Hessian Jager 
Corps to the British war effort. The diary also aids in our understanding of the 
nature of the military struggle both through Ewald's accounts of specific 
engagements and also his observations conceming the British conduct of the 
war, the Continental Army, the American militia, and other insights that he 
provides. 
British Conduct ofthe War 
The diary of Captain Ewald is particularly significant for his critical 
opinions ofBritish generals and their conduct ofthe war, and for his divulgence 
of substantial evidence relating to military activities and occurrences that 
c~mtinue to perplex historians of the Revolutionary period. 
Ewald raised the serious accusation ofBritish foot-dragging through New 
Jersey in late 1776. While the British and Hessian forces under Comwal1is were 
en route to the attack upon Fort Lee, Ewald's company had been protecting the 
right flank and had proceeded "further to the right in hopes of catching some 
[American] baggage," whereupon he received new orders to keep closer to the 
column.93 "I now perceived what was afoot," Ewald recorded, as "[w]e wanted 
to spare the King's subjects and hoped to terminate the war amicably, in which 
assumption I was strengthened ... by several English officers.''94 
After ComwalIis had captured Fort Lee with over 100 prisoners, and was 
reinforced with nine more battalions, Ewald recorded that Washington's 
vanishing anny was permitted to retreat across Jersey, an observation 
previously unknown. This deliberate delay on the part of Comwal1is enraged 
the citizens ofPennsylvania, including outspoken loyalist Joseph GalIoway,9S 
who arrived in the British camp and "implored the general to press General 
Washington as closely as possible" in order to "surely destroy and capture his 
disheartened army.'''l6 When Comwallis did not do so, Ewald recorded GalIoway 
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as shouting, "'I see, they don't want to finish the war!', which every honest
 
man must think."97 Ewald completed his entry by asserting again that "one had
 
to conclude" that the British hoped to end the war "without shedding the
 
blood of the King's subjects in a needless way.''98
 
Two days later the British army set out to folIow Washington across the
 
Delaware River, a march that took two days. Ewald was again critical ofBritish
 
slowness:
 
. 
On this two-day march, which could have been done in twelve hours 
by-an army that carried so little artillery, it became clearly evident that 
the march took place so slowly for no other reason that to permit 
Washington to cross the Delaware safely and peacefulIy.1 was assured 
that Lord Comwallis had orders from General Howe to proceed in 
such a way.-The two Howe brothers belong to the Opposition Party._ 
Therefore no more need be said. They will not and dare not act 
otherwise.99 
Observations such as the above reveal much not only about the highly
 
politicized nature of the war, but also about the general problems with British
 
strategy at the outset of the war. .
 
In England, the American Revolution was a powerful political issue. The
 
parliamentary minority was largely Whig and had supported ma1ly of the
 
American protests and arguments as opposition policy.100 To command the
 
British army and navy in America, the Ministry had appointed Major General
 
William Howe and Vice Admiral Richard Howe, two brothers who were actualIy
 
Whigs. Yet the Ministry also named them as peace commissioners to accept
 
America's submission to British authority and then to open negotiations on
 
political reforms. Historians have contended that this dual mission was probably
 
an error on the part of the British Ministry. At the very least, this dual
 
responsibility ofbeing both warriors and diplomats proved a distraction to the
 
Howes; at worst, it caused them to proceed more cautiously than they otherwise
 
,01
might have done. Whichever was the case, Ewald was obviously aware of
 
the fact that the Howe brothers were ofthe opposition party in parliament, and
 
believed this partisan orientation to be the main reason for General Howe's
 
failure to capture Washington in 1776.
 
Ewald again raised the issue ofpolitics after the battle ofBrandywine on
 
II September 1777. As he recounted the details of the battle, the British
 
envelopment ofWashington's right wing, with himselfleading the column, he
 
recalIed the slowness of the march: 
For my part, I conclude that the slow march of the left column took 
place with alI deliberation, so that the American army would not be 
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Moreover, Ewald had a very distinguished career after the American War. 
In December 1785 Ewald was ordered by the new Landgrave in Hesse-Hanau 
to organize the Hanau Jager Corps. After he had received his discharge from 
the Hessian army in February 1788, Ewald entered active service in Denmark, 
which at that time was at war with Sweden. Soon after his arrival, Ewald 
organized the Schleswig Jager Corps, which he levied and commanded with 
the rank oflieutenant colonel. In 1790 Ewald was elevated to Danish nobility, 
promoted to colonel in 1795, and to major general in 1802. He also founded a 
corps library and wrote and published three more military treatises. Ewald also 
fought valiantly during the Napoleonic wars, which resulted in his promotion 
to lieutenant general in 1809 and commanding general of the Duchy ofHolstein 
in 1812. He retired from active duty on I May 1813, after fifty-three years of 
military service.92 
Thus, Ewald's diary is ofparticular value not only because it helps students 
of the Revolution understand the significant contribution of the Hessian Jager 
Corps to the British war effort. The diary also aids in our understanding of the 
nature of the military struggle both through Ewald's accounts of specific 
engagements and also his observations concerning the British conduct of the 
war, the Continental Army, the American militia, and other insights that he 
provides. 
British Conduct ofthe War 
The diary of Captain Ewald is particularly significant for his critical 
opinions ofBritish generals and their conduct ofthe war, and for his divulgence 
of substantial evidence relating to military activities and occurrences that 
c~mtinue to perplex historians of the Revolutionary period. 
Ewald raised the serious accusation ofBritish foot-dragging through New 
Jersey in late 1776. While the British and Hessian forces under Cornwallis were 
en route to the attack upon Fort Lee, Ewald's company had been protecting the 
right flank and had proceeded "further to the right in hopes of catching some 
[American] baggage," whereupon he received new orders to keep closer to the 
column.93 "I now perceived what was afoot," Ewald recorded, as "[w]e wanted 
to spare the King's subjects and hoped to terminate the war amicably, in which 
assumption I was strengthened ... by several English officers.''94 
After Cornwallis had captured Fort Lee with over I00 prisoners, and was 
reinforced with nine more battalions, Ewald recorded that Washington's 
vanishing army was permitted to retreat across Jersey, an observation 
previously unknown. This deliberate delay on the part of Cornwallis enraged 
the citizens ofPennsylvania, including outspoken loyalist Joseph Galloway,9S 
who arrived in the British camp and "implored the general to press General 
Washington as closely as possible" in order to "surely destroy and capture his 
disheartened army.''96 When Cornwallis did not do so, Ewald recorded Galloway 
D Ziii ,;co .~,,,. 7'IUb • 
Constructing The Past 
as shouting, "'I see, they don't want to finish the war!', which every honest 
man must think.''97 Ewald completed his entry by asserting again that "one had 
to conclude" that the British hoped to end the war "without shedding the 
blood of the King's subjects in a needless way.''98 
Two days later the British army set out to follow Washington across the
 
Delaware River, a march that took two days. Ewald was again critical ofBritish
 
slowness:
 
. 
On this two-day march, which could have been done in twelve hours 
byan army that carried so little artillery, it became clearly evident that 
the march took place so slowly for no other reason that to permit 
Washington to cross the Delaware safely and peacefully. I was assured 
that Lord Cornwallis had orders from General Howe to proceed in 
such a way.-The two Howe brothers belong to the Opposition Party._ 
Therefore no more need be said. They will not and dare not act 
otherwise.99 
Observations such as the above reveal much not only about the highly
 
politicized nature of the war, but also about the general problems with British
 
strategy at the outset of the war. ,
 
In England, the American Revolution was a powerful political issue. The
 
parliamentary minority was largely Whig and had supported ma1ly of the
 
American protests and arguments as opposition policy.100 To command the
 
British army and navy in America, the Ministry had appointed Major General
 
William Howe and Vice Admiral Richard Howe, two brothers who were actually
 
Whigs. Yet the Ministry also named them as peace commissioners to accept
 
America's submission to British authority and then to open negotiations on
 
political reforms. Historians have contended that this dual mission was probably
 
an error on the part of the British Ministry. At the very least, this dual
 
responsibility ofbeing both warriors and diplomats proved a distraction to the
 
Howes; at worst, it caused them to proceed more cautiously than they otherwise
 
might have done. lo1 Whichever was the case, Ewald was obviously aware of
 
the fact that the Howe brothers were of the opposition party in parliament, and
 
believed this partisan orientation to be the main reason for General Howe's
 
failure to capture Washington in 1776.
 
Ewald again raised the issue ofpolitics after the battle ofBrandywine on
 
II September 1777. As he recounted the details of the battle, the British
 
envelopment ofWashington's right wing, with himselfleading the column, he
 
recalled the slowness of the march: 
For my part, I conclude that the slow march of the left column took 
place with all deliberation, so that the American army would not be 
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destroyed to pay a fresh compliment to the Opposition Parry, and to 
bring forth a new proposal. My suspicions were strengthened anew 
when I observed the army on the battlefield overnight - perfectly 
quiet, without a single man sent after the enemy and without any 
outposts .... 102 
Clearly, Ewald believed that Howe did not want to destroy Washington's army 
for political reasons. 
In the next week Washington's army retreated to the SchuylkiII River on 
the edge of Philadelphia and prepared for an attack against the British army 
while the latter was stiII on the march. Fortunately for the British, Washington's 
attack was drowned out in a torrential rainstorm. Ewald was critical ofBritish 
slowness, and once again attributed their failure to catch up with Washington 
to General Howe: 
I firmly believe that we still could have caught up with the greater part 
of the enemy army, at least the. baggage, somewhere near the right 
bank of the SchuylkiII River, ifit had been the will ofGeneral Howe. 
But the three-day delay on the battlefield after the battle convinced 
me that we certainly would have halted even if no rain had fallen, 
because we surely knew that we were hard on Washington's heels. 103 
Ewald's criticism ofBritish strategy continued throughout the duration of 
the army's first several campaigns, recognizing that the army had "continually 
lost in the end what we won with the first rush in the beginning."'04 
Captain Ewald was especially critical of Benedict Arnold, then a British 
brigadier general, and clashed with him over the general's tactics. Shortly after 
the army's disembarkation at the beginning of the Sixth Campaign'oS, Arnold 
had ordered the Jagers and a contingent of sharpshooters (soldiers without 
bayonets) to land at Ewald's discretion and attack a sQ1all body of Americans 
(equipped with bayonets), which had appeared on the left bank of the James 
River at Warwick, Virginia. Such poorjudgment on the part ofArnold infuriated 
Captain Ewald, who did not deny "that this little trick left me with no great 
opinion of General Arnold's judgment ... especially since the [British] light 
infantry was as close to [the Americans] as I was."I06 Ewald was also severely 
critical of Arnold's character, and noted that "his dishonourable undertaking. 
.. nevertheless cannot be justified," which itself testifies to the exceedingly 
honorable character ofCaptain Ewald. To him, Arnold's betrayal of his country 
was reprehensible: 
If he really felt in his conscience that he had done wrong in siding 
against his mother country, he should have sheathed his sword and 
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served no more .... This would have gained more proselytes than his 
shameful enterprise, which every man of honor and fine feelings ­
whether he be friend or foe - must loathe. 
Gladly as I would have paid with my blood and my life for England's 
success in this war, this man remained so detestable to me that I had 
to use every effort not to let him perceive ... the indignation of my 
SOU\.107 
Certainly, Ewald found fault not only with General Arnold's military judgment 
but with his ethical conduct as well. 
Indeed, Captain Ewald's criticism ofBritish strategy continued well into 
the Virginia Campaign of 1781. Ewald iIluminates the controversy surrounding 
Cornwallis's impending march into Virginia in his diary cntr~ prill779, 
where he was especially fearful ofwhat might happen ifCornwalus left North 
Carolina to rendezvous with Major General William Phillips and his force of 
2,000 men in Virginia Ewald concluded: 
If the junction between Cornwallis and Phillips takes place, all but a 
few posts will soon fall into the enemy's hands again. I did not like the 
proposed combination ofthe two corps as long as [General Nathanael] 
Greene still had an army in Carolina, for it meant an acre ofland won 
here and fifty lost there. But once again, it is the favorite plan of 
England to have something in every comer and much nowhere. lOR 
In truth, Ewald's apprehension concerning Cornwallis's march was quite 
similar to that felt by General SirHenry Clinton, then Commander in Chiefof the 
British forces, who had not given Cornwallis permission to march into Virginia. 
On 25 April, without waiting for orders from Clinton, Cornwallis started his 
long march northward across North Carolina, thus exposing several of the 
British posts in South Carolina to great danger. 109 Cornwallis joined the army 
under Benedict Arnold (Phil1ips had just died) at Petersburg, Virginia on 20 
May 178 I, where he also took command. Clinton, upon learning of this, was 
astounded by Cornwallis's flagrant disregard for his original orders to safeguard 
South Carolina (as now the British army had been forced into solid operation in 
Virginia a" well) and believed that the Southern campaign was therefore 
doomed. 110 Clearly, Ewald demonstrated sound knowledge of military tactics 
by observations such as this, especially when his criticisms of General 
Cornwallis were the same as those felt by the Commanding General Sir Henry 
Clinton. 
Ewald also recognized the bleakness of the situation for the British at 
Yorktown, where in August 1781 Cornwallis's force of nearly 8,000 had taken 
up a defensive posture against a numerically superior combined American and 
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destroyed to pay a fresh compliment to the Opposition Parry, and to 
bring forth a new proposal. My suspicions were strengthened anew 
when I observed the army on the battlefield overnight - perfectly 
quiet, without a single man sent after the enemy and without any 
outposts .... 102 
Clearly, Ewald believed that Howe did not want to destroy Washington's imny 
for political reasons. 
In the next week Washington's army retreated to the SchuylkiII River on 
the edge of Philadelphia and prepared for an attack against the British army 
while the latter was stiII on the march. Fortunately for the British, Washington's 
attack was drowned out in a torrential rainstorm. Ewald was critical ofBritish 
slowness, and once again attributed their failure to catch up with Washington 
to General Howe: 
I firmly believe that we stiII could have caught up with the greater part 
of the enemy army, at least the baggage, somewhere near the right 
bank of the Schuylkil1 River, ifit had been the wiII ofGeneral Howe. 
But the three-day delay on the battlefield after the battle convinced 
me that we certainly would have halted even if no rain had fal1en, 
because we surely knew that we were hard on Washington's heels. 'OJ 
Ewald's criticism ofBritish strategy continued throughout the duration of 
the army's first several campaigns, recognizing that the army had "continual1y 
lost in the end what we won with the first rush in the beginning."I04 
Captain Ewald was especial1y critical of Benedict Arnold, then a British 
brigadier general, and clashed with him over the general's tactics. Shortly after 
the army's disembarkation at the beginning of the Sixth Campaign'oS, Arnold 
had ordered the Jagers and a contingent of sharpshooters (soldiers without 
bayonets) to land at Ewald's discretion and attack a slllal1 body ofAmericans 
(equipped with bayonets), which had appeared on the left bank of the James 
River at Warwick, Virginia. Such poor judgment on the part ofArnold infuriated 
Captain Ewald, who did not deny "that this little trick left me with no great 
opinion of General Arnold's judgment ... especialIy since the [British] light 
infantry was as close to [the Americans] as I was."I06 Ewald was also severely 
critical of Arnold's character, and noted that "his dishonourable undertaking. 
.. nevertheless cannot be justified," which itself testifies to the exceedingly 
honorable character ofCaptain Ewald. To him, Arnold's betrayal ofhis country 
was reprehensible: 
If he really felt in his conscience that he had done wrong in siding 
against his mother country, he should have sheathed his sword and 
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served no more .... This would have gained more proselytes than his 
shameful enterprise, which every man of honor and fine feelings ­
whether he be friend or foe - must loathe. 
Gladly as I would have paid with my blood and my life for England's 
success in this war, this man remained so detestable to me that I had 
to use every effort not to let him perceive ... the indignation of my 
soul. 107 
Certainly, Ewald found fault not only with General Arnold's military judgment 
but with his ethical conduct as well. 
Indeed, Captain Ewald's criticism ofBritish strategy continued welI into 
the Virginia Campaign of 1781. Ewald illuminates the controversy surrounding 
Cornwallis's impending march into Virginia in his diary cntf) pril 1779, 
where he was especialIy fearful ofwhat might happen ifCornwallts left North 
Carolina to rendezvous with Major General William Phillips and his force of 
2,000 men in Virginia Ewald concluded: 
If the junction between Cornwallis and Phillips takes place, alI but a 
few posts will soon falI into the enemy's hands again. I did not like the 
proposed combination ofthe two corps as long as [General Nathanael] 
Greene stiII had an army in Carolina, for it meant an acre ofland won 
here and fifty lost there. But once again, it is the favorite plan of 
England to have something in every comer and much nowhere. 108 
In truth, Ewald's apprehension concerning CornwalIis's march was quite 
similar to that felt by General SirHenry Clinton, then Commander in Chiefof the 
British forces, who had not given CornwalIis permission to march into Virginia. 
On 25 April, without waiting for orders from Clinton, Cornwallis started his 
long march northward across North Carolina, thus exposing several of the 
British posts in South Carolina to great danger. 109 CornwalIis joined the army 
under Benedict Arnold (PhiIlips had just died) at Petersburg, Virginia on 20 
May 1781, where he also took command. Clinton, upon learning of this, was 
astounded by Cornwallis's flagrant disregard for his original orders to safeguard 
South Carolina (as now the British army had been forced into solid operation in 
Virginia ac; welI) and believed that the Southern campaign was therefore 
doomed. 110 Clearly, Ewald demonstrated sound knowledge of military tactics 
by observations such as this, especialIy when his criticisms of General 
Cornwallis were the same as those felt by the Commanding General Sir Henry 
Clinton. 
Ewald also recognized the bleakness of the situation for the British at 
Yorktown, where in August 1781 Cornwallis's force of nearly 8,000 had taken 
up a defensive posture against a numericalIy superior combined American and 
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French force ofalmost 18,000 troops. As a British naval force sailed from New 
York City to reinforce Cornwallis, the sinking spirits ofthe British soldiers were 
raised a bit. Ewald, however, took a more realistic view of their predicament: 
Without bragging about my limited perception, I have told everyone 
that as soon as one of these redoubts is taken the business is at an 
end, and Washington has us in his pocket. Yet one still hears, "But 
our fleet will come before that time and raise the siege."111 
Cornwallis, who by late September knew that 'he was in dire straits, shared 
Ewald's view. On the night of 16 October two vital redoubts fell, and the next 
day Cornwallis asked for terms of surrender. I 12 Two days later his troops, 
British, Loyalist, and German, marched into captivity. Ewald again illuminated 
the highly politicized nature of the war after Cornwallis's capture, noting that 
"[t]his disaster ... will give the Opposition party in England enough impetus to 
carry through its plan to give up the dominions in North America."'13 And 
once more, Ewald offered up a critical assessment ofBritish military failure: 
This is the res,ult ofthe absurd rules established during a war in which 
no plan was followed. The enemy was only pulled in all directions and 
nowhere driven by force, whereby all was lost, when it was desired to 
preserve all. It is terrible, when one considers that the finest and most 
valiant army - after six campaigns - was brought completely liack to 
the point from which it started with the most auspicious prospects six 
years ago. And this, indeed, against a people who were no soldiers, 
and who could have been stamped to the ground in the first year.114 
Obviously, Ewald believed that British strategy had been faulty from the outset 
ofthe war in America. 
Indeed, Ewald's critical opinions of the British generals and their conduct 
of the war help us to gain a better understanding of the highly politicized 
nature of the militafy contest and the problems ofBritain ' s overall strategy, as 
the British army "was put to such poor use that eight campaigns were lost, 
followed by the loss of thirteen provinces, which in a word, had tom down the 
Crown ofEngland from its loftiest peak."115 Moreover, Ewald's opinions are of 
considerable value because of his position as one who not only enjoyed 
professional relationships with the British commanders but who was also always 
active in the field fighting beside his troops in every major battle of the war 
plus a countless number of those smaller engagements which characterized, in 
the words of General Washington, the "War ofPosts."1I6 
Constructing The Past 
The Continental Army 
Equally important are Ewald's observations with respect to the Continental 
Army, as we can observe the changing nature of this army over the course of 
the war as well as the determined and resolute character of the Continental 
soldier. Students of the Revolution can clearly observe the developing nature 
of the Continental Army as revealed by Captain Ewald's field notes. As the 
situation stood in 1775, the American colonies lacked a standing army and 
were thus the militarily weaker side. While the siege ofBoston moved toward 
the fierce contest at Bunker Hill, the Continental Congress voted to raise 15,000 
troops as a Continental army and selected Colonel George Washington of 
Virginia as commander in chief. I17 
Not only was the Continental Army a poor man's army, as there were 
outstanding uniform and equipment deficiencies, but it was also largely 
untrained and far less disciplined than its European counterpart. Certainly, the 
Continentals "could not match the well-drilled British [and Hessians] in the 
battlefield maneuverability and tactical articulation of their battalions."118 
Indeed, neither Washington nor his lieutenants were soldiers "steeped in the 
literature ofwar."119 
As the Ewald diary reveals, however, the American officers made strenuous 
efforts to correct this lack ofdoctrinal knowledge on the part of their army. He 
recorded in December 1777 that during the first two years of the war: 
the Americans have trained a great many excellent officers who very 
often shame and excel our experienced officers, who consider it sinful 
to read a book or to think of learning anything during the war. 120 
On one occasion when Ewald examined a knapsack his Jagers had taken 
offof a Continental soldier, he discovered "the most excellent military books 
. translated into their language."121 Apparently this had been the case countless 
times before, as Ewald recorded that he had found several of these books, 
including Tielke's Field Engineer and "the Instructions ofthe great Frederick 
to his generals ... more than one hundred times."122 "Moreover," he continued, 
"several oftheir officers had designed excellent small handbooks and distributed 
them in the army."12J Obviously, continual discoveries of this kind impressed 
Captain Ewald: 
Upon rmding these books, I have exhorted our gentlemen many times 
to read and emulate these people, who only two years before were 
hunters, lawyers, physicians, clergymen, tradesmen, innkeepers, 
shoemakers, and tailors. '24 
Clearly, the American officers were quite conscious ofwhat they did not 
know and recognized the disadvantage at which this deficiency placed them. 
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French force ofalmost 18,000 troops. As a British naval force sailed from New 
York City to reinforce Cornwallis, the sinking spirits ofthe British soldiers were 
raised a bit. Ewald, however, took a more realistic view of their predicament: 
Without bragging about my limited perception, I have told everyone 
that as soon as one of these redoubts is taken the business is at an 
end, and Washington has us in his pocket. Yet one still hears, "But 
our fleet will come before that time and raise the siege."111 
Cornwallis, who by late September knew that 'he was in dire straits, shared 
Ewald's view. On the night of 16 October two vital redoubts fell, and the next 
day Cornwallis asked for terms of surrender,112 Two days later his troops, 
British, Loyalist, and German, marched into captivity. Ewald again illuminated 
the highly politicized nature of the war after Cornwallis's capture, noting that 
"[t]his disaster .. , will give the Opposition party in England enough impetus to 
carry through its plan to give up the dominions in North America,"'13 And 
once more, Ewald offered up a critical assessment ofBritish military failure: 
This is the res,ult of the absurd rules established during a war in which 
no plan was followed. The enemy was only pulled in all directions and 
nowhere driven by force, whereby all was lost, when it was desired to 
preserve aIL It is terrible, when one considers that the finest and most 
valiant anny - after six campaigns - was brought completely reck to 
the point from which it started with the most auspicious prospects six 
years ago. And this, indeed, against a people who were no soldiers, 
and who could have been stamped to the ground in the first year,1I4 
Obviously, Ewald believed that British strategy had been faulty from the outset 
ofthe war in America. 
Indeed, Ewald's critical opinions of the British generals and their conduct 
of the war help us to gain a better understanding of the highly politicized 
nature ofthe military contest and the problems ofBritain's overall strategy, as 
the British anny "was put to such poor use that eight campaigns were lost, 
followed by the loss of thirteen provinces, which in a word, had tom down the 
Crown ofEngland from its loftiest peak."1IS Moreover, Ewald's opinions are of 
considerable value because of his position as one who not only enjoyed 
professional relationships with the British commanders but who was also always 
active in the field fighting beside his troops in every major battle of the war 
plus a countless number of those smaller engagements which characterized, in 
the words of General Washington, the "War ofPosts."1I6 
Constructing The Past 
The Continental Army 
Equally important are Ewald's observations with respect to the Continental 
Army, as we can observe the changing nature of this anny over the course of 
the war as wen as the determined and resolute character of the Continental 
soldier. Students of the Revolution can clearly observe the developing nature 
of the Continental Army as revealed by Captain Ewald's field notes. As the 
situation stood in 1775, the American colonies lacked a standing anny and 
were thus the militarily weaker side. While the siege ofBoston moved toward 
the fierce contest at Bunker Hill, the Continental Congress voted to raise 15,000 
troops as a Continental anny and selected Colonel George Washington of 
Virginia as commander in chief.117 
Not only was the Continental Army a poor man's army, as there were 
outstanding uniform and equipment deficiencies, but it was also largely 
untrained and far less disciplined than its European counterpart. Certainly, the 
Continentals "could not match the wen-drined British [and Hessians] in the 
battlefield maneuverability and tactical articulation of their battalions."118 
Indeed, neither Washington nor his lieutenants were soldiers "steeped in the 
literature ofwar."119 
As the Ewald diary reveals, however, the American officers made strenuous 
efforts to correct this lack ofdoctrinal knowledge on the part oftheir army. He 
recorded in December 1777 that during the first two years of the war: 
the Americans have trained a great many excellent officers who very 
often shame and excel our experienced officers, who consider it sinful 
to read a book or to think of learning anything during the war. 120 
On one occasion when Ewald examined a knapsack his lagers had taken 
offofa Continental soldier, he discovered "the most excellent military books 
. translated into their language."'2! Apparently this had been the case countless 
times before, as Ewald recorded that he had found several of these books, 
including Tielke's Field Engineer and "the Instrnctions of the great Frederick 
to his generals .. , more than one hundred times."122 "Moreover," he continued, 
"several oftheir officers had designed excellent small handbooks and distributed 
them in the anny."12J Obviously, continual discoveries of this kind impressed 
Captain Ewald: 
Upon fmding these books, I have exhorted our gentlemen many times 
to read and emulate these people, who only two years before were 
hunters, lawyers, physicians, clergymen, tradesmen, innkeepers, 
shoemakers, and tailors,124 
Clearly, the American officers were quite conscious ofwhat they did not 
know and recognized the disadvantage at which this deficiency placed them. 
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Thus they strove not only to instruct themselves by reading military books but 
impressed this need to learn upon their soldiers as well. 
Also visible through Ewald's observations are the improvements made in 
the training and drilling of the American army as a result of the efforts of 
Prussian drillmaster Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, who arrived in 
America on I December 1777 as "the answer to the American training problem 
and a way in which the American army could be made more effective."1lS Upon 
examining Washington's soldiers at Valley Forge in early 1778, Steuben 
instituted a training program (essentially an adaptation of the Prussian drill 
system) which would give the army a uniformity it had never possessed. His 
work proved exceedingly valuable, as the American soldiers learned close­
quarter drill and ceremony, how to properly carry the musket, load it, and fife it, 
how to fIx the bayonet, and how to chargey6 Ewald attested to the effectiveness 
of Steuben's instruction: 
The so-called Continental, or standing, regiments are under good 
discipline and drill ... as well as the English themselves. I have seen 
the Rhode Island regiment march and perform several mountings of 
the guard which left nothing to criticize. The men were complete 
masters of their legs, carried their weapons well, held their heads 
straight, faced right without moving an eye, and wheeled so excellently 
without their officers having to shout much, that the regiment looked 
like it was dressed with a string. 12? 
TheAmerican Army thus becamemore skillful under the instruction ofSteuben, 
as Captain Ewald could certainly affirm. Apparently the Continental Congress 
had taken notice as well, as they had in May 1778 appointed Steuben inspector 
general of the army with the rank and pay ofmajor general. 
Additionally, the Ewald diary reveals the determined and resolute nature 
of the Continental soldier as seen through the eyes of a foreign observer. 
While conducting patrols in New Jersey in the late November 1776, Ewald and 
the Jagers skirmished with American riflemen from the corps ofColonel Daniel 
Morgan. When the Jagers took a prisoner, Ewald questioned the man to fmd 
out where the Americans were posted. "The captured rifleman," Ewald recorded, 
"resolutely declared that he was my prisoner but not my spy. I admired this 
worthy man."128 Certainly, Ewald did not share the "contempt of the English" 
with regard to his enemy, but asserted that "one should not think that [the 
American army] can be compared to a motley crowd offarmers" such as the 
militia. 129 Ewald attested to seeing many Continental soldiers "without shoes, 
with tattered breeches and uniforms ... who marched and stood their guard as 
proudly as the best uniformed soldier in the world."IJO 
Ewald's most illuminating observations concerning the determination of 
the Continental army came shortly after Cornwallis's surrender: 
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With what soldiers in the world could one do what was done by these 
men, who go about nearly naked and in the greatest privation? Deny 
the best-disciplined soldiers of Europe what is due them and they will 
run away in droves, and the geneml will soon be alone. But from this 
one can perceive what an enthusiasm - which these poor fellows call 
"Liberty" - can do!1Jl 
Indeed, Ewald's assertion was sustained by that of Steuben, who upon 
his initial inspection ofWashington's army at Valley Forge had reported that 
no European army would have held together under such deprivations of food, 
clothing, and shelter. 132 The determination of the American Army left such a 
considerable impact on Ewald that he recorded a very similar analysis of his 
former opponents upon a visit to the garrison at West Point shortly before hill 
return to Germany: 
Although I shuddered at the distress of these men, it fIlled me with 
awe for them, for I did not think there was an army in the world which 
could be maintained as cheaply as the American army....-What army 
could be maintained in this manner? None, certainly, for the whole 
army would gradually run away.-This, too, is a part of the "Liberty 
and Independence" for which these poor fellows had to have their 
arms and legs smashed.-But to what cannot enthusiasm lead a 
people!1H ., 
Clearly, the Ewald diary reveals the fortitude ofthe American soldiers and their 
faithful devotion to their cause. Through Ewald we see the resolute <;haracter 
of an army that willingly endured the hardships ofmateriel defIciency in order 
to cast off the yoke of the English government once and for all. 
Conclusion 
The diary ofCaptain Ewald, an experienced, professional soldier, is a most 
important contribution to the understanding of the nature of the War of the 
Revolution. It enables us to arrive at a more accumte estimation of the signifIcant 
Hessian contribution to the British war effort, particularly that ofCaptain Ewald 
and the Field Jager Corps, the Hessian elite light infantry. The Ewald diary 
opens up the wider issues of Hessian participation and our interpretation of 
the same, as we can clearly ascertain the usefulness of Ewald and the Jager 
Corps and the importance and signifIcance of their service to the army of Sir 
William Howe and other British genemls. 
Even though the Jagers were only a small fraction (numbering slightly 
over 1,000 troops) of the total Hessian forces, the Ewald diary reveals that the 
Jagers did indeed perform signifIcant duties disproportionate to their relative 
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Thus they strove not only to instruct themselves by reading military books but 
impressed this need to learn upon their soldiers as well. 
Also visible through Ewald's observations are the improvements made in 
the training and drilling of the American army as a result of the efforts of 
Prussian drillmaster Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, who arrived in 
America on I December 1777 as "the answer to the American training problem 
and a way in which the American army could be made more effective."12s Upon 
examining Washington's soldiers at Valley Forge in early 1778, Steuben 
instituted a training program (essentially an adaptation of the Prussian drill 
system) which would give the army a unifonnity it had never possessed. His 
work proved exceedingly valuable, as the American soldiers learned close­
quarter drill and ceremony, how to properly carry the musket, load it, and fife it, 
how to fix the bayonet, and how to chargey6 Ewald attested to the effectiveness 
of Steuben's instruction: 
The so-called Continental, or standing, regiments are under good 
discipline and drill ... as well as the English themselves. I have seen 
the Rhode Island regiment march and perfonn several mountings of 
the guard which left nothing to criticize. The men were complete 
masters of their legs, carried their weapons well, held their heads 
straight, faced right without moving an eye, and wheeled so excellently 
without their officers having to shout much, that the regiment looked 
like it was dressed with a string. 127 
TheAmerican Anny thus becamemore skillful under the instruction ofSteuben, 
as Captain Ewald could certainly afflnn. Apparently the Continental Congress 
had taken notice as well, as they had in May 1778 appointed Steuben inspector 
general of the army with the rank and pay ofmajor general. 
Additionally, the Ewald diary reveals the detennined and resolute nature 
of the Continental soldier as seen through the eyes Qf a foreign observer. 
While conducting patrols in New Jersey in the late November 1776, Ewald and 
the Jagers skinnished with American riflemen from the corps ofColonel Daniel 
Morgan. When the Jagers took a prisoner, Ewald questioned the man to fmd 
out where the Americans were posted. "The captured rifleman," Ewald recorded, 
"resolutely declared that he was my prisoner but not my spy. I admired this 
worthy man."128 Certainly, Ewald did not share the "contempt of the English" 
with regard to his enemy, but asserted that "one should not think that [the 
American army] can be compared to a motley crowd offarmers" such as the 
militia. 129 Ewald attested to seeing many Continental soldiers "without shoes, 
with tattered breeches and unifonns ... who marched and stood their guard as 
proudly as the best unifonned soldier in the world."IJO 
Ewald's most illuminating observations concerning the detennination of 
the Continental anny came shortly after Cornwallis's surrender: 
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With what soldiers in the world could one do what was done by these 
men, who go about nearly naked and in the greatest privation? Deny 
the best-disciplined soldiers ofEurope what is due them and they will 
run away in droves, and the geneml will soon be alone. But from this 
one can perceive what an enthusiasm - which these poor fellows call 
"Liberty" - can do!1JI 
Indeed, Ewald's assertion was sustained by that of Steuben, who upon 
his initial inspection ofWashington's anny at Valley Forge had reported that 
no European army would have held together under such deprivations of food, 
clothing, and shelter. 132 The detennination of the American Anny left such a 
considerable impact on Ewald that he recorded a very similar analysis of his 
fonner opponents upon a visit to the garrison at West Point shortly before hill 
return to Gennany: 
Although I shuddered at the distress of these men, it fllIed me with 
awe for them, for I did not think there was an army in the world which 
could be maintained as cheaply as the American army....-What army 
could be maintained in this manner? None, certainly, for the whole 
anny would gradually run away.-This, too, is a part of the "Liberty 
and Independence" for which these poor fellows had to have their 
anns and legs smashed.-But to what cannot enthusiasm lead a 
people!1H ., 
Clearly, the Ewald diary reveals the fortitude of the American soldiers and their 
faithful devotion to their cause. Through Ewald we see the resolute (;haracter 
ofan army that willingly endured the hardships ofmateriel deficiency in order 
to cast off the yoke of the English government once and for all. 
Conclusion 
The diary ofCaptain Ewald, an experienced, professional soldier, is a most 
important contribution to the understanding of the nature of the War of the 
Revolution. It enables us to arrive at a more accumte estimation of the significant 
Hessian contribution to the British war effort, particularly that ofCaptain Ewald 
and the Field Jager Corps, the Hessian elite light infantry. The Ewald diary 
opens up the wider issues of Hessian participation and our interpretation of 
the same, as we can clearly ascertain the usefulness of Ewald and the Jager 
Corps and the importance and significance of their service to the anny of Sir 
William Howe and other British genemls. 
Even though the Jagers were only a small fraction (numbering slightly 
over 1,000 troops) of the total Hessian forces, the Ewald diary reveals that the 
Jagers did indeed perfonn significant duties disproportionate to their relative 
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numbers. The Jagers were extremely useful to the British anny, and were 
especially effective against American riflemen and artillery positions during 
sieges. They often led the vanguard of British and 
Hessian forces or flanked both sides of the column, and just as often 
fonned the rear guard which covered a retreat or withdrawal. When the troops 
deployed in battle, the Jiigers usually fonned the flanks. Frequently operating 
as detachments, they were also employed to great advantage in reconnoitering 
and patrol duties, and in protecting foraging parties and headquarters. Clearly, 
the Jagers added far more to the British war effort than numbers alone. Their 
active combat service was militarily significant, as they enhanced the power 
and maneuverability ofthe British anny and thus strengthened British capability 
to conduct the war. In light ofthis, the standing military histories ofthe American 
Revolution are in need of revision, which will restore the importance of the 
Hessian Jager Corps as a far more significant part of the total British fighting 
force that attempted to subdue the American colonies. Thus, the effect of the 
Ewald diary is not only to add depth to the existing body of knowledge 
concerning Hessian participation in the American Revolution, but also to allow 
us to make a different judgment which will correct the standing military histories 
of the conflict. 
The Ewald diary is additionally important because it allows us to better 
understand the nature of the American Revolution as a military contest. His 
diary reveals not only the importance of the Hessian Jager Corps to the British 
anny, but also gives students of the American Revolution a first-hand look at 
the partisan and irregular nature of the war. 
Furthennore, Ewald is a unique observer and incredible commentator on 
the Revolution, and is able to reveal things about the total conflict that have 
otherwise received scant attention as well. Ewald's military judgments 
concerning British conduct of the war reveal the highly politicized nature of 
the conflict and the overall problems with British strategy. His observations 
concerning the American anny reveal a detennined body of soldiers who 
willingly endured continual hardship in order to cast off the yoke ofthe English 
government. 
Moreover, Ewald is exceedingly qualified to comment and his observations 
are oHar more value simply because of his position as an officer on the front 
lines who also enjoyed not only the professional friendship but also the 
confidence of numerous high-ranking British officers. Perspectives such as 
this are scarce, which is the reason that the Ewald diary is of such great value 
to students of the American Revolution. In addition, the fact that Ewald 
published his Treatise on Partisan Waifare (1785) upon returning to Gennany 
reflects not only his real interest in military tactics but is greater proof of his 
professionalism and gives him larger credence as a diarist. 
Constructing The Past ~ 
Indeed, through the diary of Captain Ewald we can not only correct the 
standing military histories of the Revolution to include the importance of the 
Hessian Jager Corps as a far more significant part of the British war effort, but 
we can in essence understand more distinctly the nature of the conflict which, 
in the words of Ewald, ultimately resulted in the "utter loss of the thirteen 
splendid provinces of the Crown of England."134 
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numbers. The Jagers were extremely useful to the British anny, and were 
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the Jagers added far more to the British war effort than numbers alone. Their 
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Revolution are in need of revision, which will restore the importance of the 
Hessian Jager Corps as a far more significant part of the total British fighting 
force that attempted to subdue the American colonies. Thus, the effect of the 
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government. 
Moreover, Ewald is exceedingly qualified to comment and his observations 
are of far more value simply because of his position as an officer on the front 
lines who also enjoyed not only the professional friendship but also the 
confidence of numerous high-ranking British officers. Perspectives such as 
this are scarce, which is the reason that the Ewald diary is of such great value 
to students of the American Revolution. In addition, the fact that Ewald 
published his Treatise on Partisan Warfare (1785) upon returning to Germany 
reflects not only his real interest in military tactics but is greater proof of his 
professionalism and gives him larger credence as a diarist. 
Constructing The Past ~ 
Indeed, through the diary of Captain Ewald we can not only correct the 
standing military histories of the Revolution to include the importance of the 
Hessian Jager Corps as a far more significant part of the British war effort, but 
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in the words of Ewald, ultimately resulted in the "utter loss of the thirteen 
splendid provinces of the Crown of England."134 
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Benjamin Franklin and Transgenderal Pseudonymity 
Jared C. Calaway 
Pseudonymity was a widespread phenomenon in the eighteenth century, utilized especially by those who criticized the established norm. By taking on another persona, a cultural critic could deflect 
responsibility for what he or she wrote while making his or her arguments 
appear stronger, ostensibly coming from a disinterested source.' Women found 
advantages in taking on a man's name since it was easier for a man to publish 
his work than for a woman. However, women did not monopolize transgenderal 
pseudonymity because, interestingly, men also adopted female pseudonyms. 
One prolific writer who created several female pseudonyms was Benjamin 
Franklin. However, one must wonder why he took on the guise of a woman. 
What advantage did he gain by using a female, instead of a male, voice? 
Indeed, these questions do not concern the immediate intention of a specific 
pseudonym, but the underlying purposes of using a female voice. Since few 
historians have grappled with these questions, I have relied upon my own 
analysis of these letters (all of Franklin's female pseudonyms have a letter 
format). Through my analysis, I have discovered a distinct pattern ofreversal.2 
Frank1in's imaginary women extol female virtue, criticize male vice, and reveal 
how male vices create female vices, directly opposing the assumption in the 
first half of the eighteenth century that women corrupt men.3 Moreover, this 
paper will explore historiographical problems, especially the difficulty in 
ascribing a pseudonym to a real person.4 
Franklin's first female pseudonym appeared in his brother's newspaper, 
the Courant on 2 April 1722. Frank1in's brother, James Franklin, as well as the 
contributing editors to the Courant used pseudonyms, including those of the 
opposite sex, when criticizing ministers and magistrates, poking fun at rival 
papers, uncovering and creating scandal, and criticizing the follies ofwomen. ~ 
Itwas in this milieu that Benjamin Franklin, at the age ofsixteen, employed the 
guise ofa forty-year-old woman, Silence Dogood.6 In fourteen letters, Silence 
Dogood pokes fun at ministers, especially those who went to Harvard. In a 
dream, Dogood envisions Learning sitting on her throne above two high, 
difficult steps. Sitting at the base of the first step were Madam Idleness and 
Maid Ignorance.7 Most Harvard students were content to sit with Idleness and 
Ignorance instead of attaining Learning; thus, they did not attain the virtue of 
knowledge but the archetypical female vices ofignorance and idleness, finishing 
their education "as great Blockheads as ever, only more proud and self­
conceited."8 
'-" A94 4UQ;p::. 
